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SMALL NATIONS SEEK PRECEDENTS FOR DEALING WITH GERMANY

ALTHOUGH Germany and Japan, which form the central problems in peacemaking in Europe and Asia, are not on the agenda of the 21-nation conference which opened in Paris on July 29, delegates at the Luxembourg Palace are keenly aware that precedents now being established in connection with the conclusion of treaties with Italy, Finland and the Danubian states will carry great weight in determining how peace will be made with the principal Axis powers later. Accordingly, Belgium and the Netherlands, who feel that their views are being ignored in the handling of the German question, and New Zealand and Australia, who have long feared that the great powers might ignore their advice on the Pacific settlement, have taken the lead in efforts to prevent the Big Four from dominating the Peace Conference. During the past week these small independent powers—whose number does not include Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, the Ukraine and White Russia, all of whom vote with Russia in a more or less solid bloc—waged a diplomatic battle against the Big Four within the vitally important Committee on Rules.

BIG-FOUR UNANIMITY IN PARIS? In one encounter the small nations insisted that the Conference elect its own chairman rather than submit to the suggestion of the recent Council of Foreign Ministers that the Big Four and China rotate the office among themselves. This attempt failed on August 3, when Foreign Minister Molotov strongly opposed any change in the chairmanship plan submitted by the Foreign Ministers, and the United States and Britain supported his stand. In a second and even more important revolt against domination by the great powers, the smaller states demanded that a simple majority rather than a two-thirds vote—as proposed by the Big Four—suffice to adopt

recommendations by the Conference to the Foreign Ministers concerning the peace treaties. This effort placed the Big Four in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, none of them was willing to have the hard-won agreement of the Foreign Ministers easily upset. On the other hand, Britain and the United States, especially, were reluctant to appear as the opponents of the small nations' demand that the Conference be more than a rubber-stamp for the treaties drafted by the Big Four.

In an effort to find a compromise solution, Britain suggested that the Conference send two kinds of proposals to the Foreign Ministers—"suggestions," which would require only a majority vote, and "recommendations," which would require a two-thirds vote. Then, in order to insure the effectiveness of the "recommendations," Secretary of State Byrnes brought forward a plan whereby the Foreign Ministers would be bound by these proposals when it prepared the final drafts of the treaties. Even if the British and American suggestions are adopted, however, the small nations will almost certainly find it extremely difficult to muster a two-thirds majority on any important questions, and the doctrine of great power unanimity as the prerequisite to the conclusion of the peace treaties will remain fundamentally unchanged.

BIG FOUR DIVIDED IN GERMANY? While the Big Four assiduously avoid making any concessions to the demands of the small nations that might impair their unanimity on decisions already reached by the Council of Foreign Ministers, they find themselves openly divided in Germany. Just one year after the conclusion of the Potsdam agreement, which was to form the foundation for Allied policy toward the defeated Reich until a peace treaty could be concluded, this agreement is in danger of being

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entirely nullified. In fact, it may be said that the Potsdam arrangements have never been fulfilled, for one of their basic provisions was that Germany—despite its partition into four zones of occupation—should be administered as an economic unit. This plan was based in part upon a recognition of the fact that Germany had a highly integrated economy which could not be disrupted during the period of military occupation without creating enormous economic problems for the Allies, particularly Britain and the United States, whose areas of western and southern Germany normally relied for a large part of their food supply upon the agricultural areas within the Russian zone. In addition, the maintenance of economic unity in Germany was regarded as essential to the eventual reintegration of the country. This policy Russia, Britain and the United States avowedly endorsed, on the twofold assumption that German unity was a historical fact which could not be ignored, and that partition of the Reich would lead to bitter rivalry among the Big Three for Germany's support.

Despite the Potsdam agreement, Germany has been administered during the past year as four separate states. As one result of this failure to treat the various zones as an economic unit, Britain and the United States have been obliged to shoulder a heavy relief burden in Germany, which has made it appear that they—rather than the defeated state—are, in effect, paying reparations. Even more important, Germany has been subjected to the economic policies of four separate powers rather than to a single Allied policy. In the absence of over-all arrangements, Britain and the United States have dealt with their zones primarily on a day-to-day basis and awaited implementation of the Potsdam plans, but Russia has virtually integrated its zone into the Soviet economy by means of its reparation collections and provision of raw materials to German factories producing goods for Russian consumption. Under

these conditions Britain and the United States have repeatedly called for the prompt implementation of the Potsdam economic program for Germany. However, since neither London nor Washington could devise any method of enforcing compliance with Potsdam which would not run the risk of incurring outright Russian opposition—thus leading to the very partition of Germany they sought to avoid—it seemed that the Western powers were caught in a hopeless impasse. In what Mr. Byrnes described on July 11 as a "last resort," the United States finally attempted to secure the economic reintegration of Germany by inviting all or any of the other occupying powers to undertake economic co-operation with the American zone. Britain, with considerable reluctance, accepted this invitation on July 29, and negotiations for economic merger of the American and British zones are now underway. The French have not indicated what their reply will be, but it appears at least possible that they may eventually follow the American and British lead. It is, therefore, upon Russia that major responsibility now rests for the decision as to whether the Reich shall be divided into "eastern" and "western" Germanies.

What Russia's course of action will be is not yet entirely clear. Although Marshal Vassily D. Sokolovsky, Russian military governor in Germany, expressed his disapproval of the American plan on July 30, he has not flatly rejected it. Face-to-face with the prospect of a definite break with the Western powers in Germany, Russia may possibly decide that the disadvantages which would accrue from this situation outweigh the advantages of exclusive economic and political control over its own zone. If this conclusion is not reached in Moscow, the theory of Big-Four unanimity as the basis for peacemaking will have suffered a far more powerful blow than it is likely to receive at the hands of the small nations at the Paris Conference. WINIFRED N. HADSEL

WASHINGTON WELCOMES NEW REGIME IN BOLIVIA

The violent revolution that flared up in Bolivia on July 19 was a spontaneous, popular and anonymous attack upon the dictatorial Villaroel régime, which itself had taken power by violent means in December 1943. Three days later President Gualberto Villaroel was assassinated, and his government was supplanted by a *junta* of teachers, students and workers headed by Dr. Nestor Guillén, Dean of the Supreme Court of La Paz. The uprising started with demonstrations by professors and students of the University of La Paz, and was reinforced by the industrial workers of the capital, who called a general strike, and by units of the Bolivian army which deserted to the revolutionary cause. As exiled-opposition leaders began to return to the country, provisional President Guillén promised free elections,

restoration of civil liberties and press freedom, and a general amnesty for political prisoners. Since this transitional government is predominantly civilian and leftist, it is probable that the coming elections will bring to power a more representative administration than was the case in the last elections held in 1940, when only 85,000 of Bolivia's three and a half million people voted.

VILLAROEEL'S RADICAL PROGRAM. In the future, Villaroel's rule may be remembered principally for his efforts to effect a radical transformation of economic and social conditions in the Indian Republic. The social drive behind the 1943 coup was contributed by the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement), a political coalition of intellectuals and workers. The MNR was colored by nationalist and

pro-fascist sentiment and allied itself with certain elements in the Bolivian army which described themselves as "anti-capitalist." To the extent that this movement was committed to a program of social improvement, it was in many respects comparable to the Argentine nationalist revolution. But the Villaroel government went further by recognizing the right of labor to organize, prohibiting the arbitrary removal and transfer of union leaders, and setting up labor services. By strengthening trade unionism it departed from the nazi-fascist pattern, and perhaps prepared the way for its own downfall. As the foreign relations of the Villaroel régime became more strained and internal problems multiplied, the social drive lost its momentum. The nationalist-military clique took refuge in increasingly repressive measures, including a rigorous press censorship, in order to maintain itself in power.

It is impossible to dissociate the domestic causes of the revolution of 1943 from the larger complex of inter-American relations. The remote Bolivian uplands were then the scene of political warfare between Germany, working with and through the Argentine military government, and the United States. In the Blue Book published in February 1946, the Department of State presented documentary evidence that the Villaroel régime had come to power with assistance from Buenos Aires and Berlin. The question of recognizing the Bolivian régime became a pawn in the more important contest centering on Argentina's position in the European war. In return for certain concessions from Villaroel, the United States recognized the revolutionary *junta* on June 23, 1944. Although the Bolivian government ostensibly shifted its support to the United Nations, its policies have followed closely those of Argentina. Washington continued to press the Villaroel administration to eliminate the influence of fascist groups and individuals in the government. In company with all the Latin American nations except Argentina, the United States only a month ago made a formal protest to the Bolivian government re-

garding the series of murders and atrocities for which it was responsible. The emphatic stand of the State Department undoubtedly contributed to the success of the July 19 counterrevolution, and it may be assumed that the United States will recognize the Guillén *junta*, since it is Washington's understanding that the revolution has diminished Perón's chances of consolidating an Argentine bloc in South America.

Whether the new government will be able to act independently of Argentina is a matter of considerable conjecture. Landlocked Bolivia is less a nation than a frontier—the great, sprawling frontier of three aggressive Latin American countries, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The instability of its economy, peculiarly dependent on the export of one product, tin, is another reason why Bolivia is so sensitive to outside pressures. The country is largely dependent on foreign sources, especially Argentina, for its requirements of wheat, processed foods, consumer goods, and machinery. To shift the emphasis from tin mining to agriculture, as Bolivians hope to do eventually, requires the opening up of the eastern lowlands, which lie 600 to 1,000 miles away from La Paz and 11,000 feet below that city.

The exploitation of the great tropical hinterland calls for resources of transport, labor and capital which Bolivia does not possess. The country's difficult economic situation, moreover, subjects it to extremes of social agitation, as Villaroel's experience so aptly demonstrated. As a result of new educational opportunities and improvements in the legal status of the peon and the miner, the Indians have become increasingly restive and self-conscious. Whether they will be satisfied with the painfully slow pace at which reforms must be conducted to be permanently successful, or will demand more sweeping action, depends on two factors: the quality of statesmanship that the new leaders of the Bolivian government may display; and the attitudes which neighboring countries adopt toward Bolivia in this extraordinarily anxious moment in its history.

OLIVE HOLMES

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
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Washington News Letter



BROADCASTS AND LIBRARIES PROMOTE U.S. POLICIES ABROAD

The United States relies on its official international shortwave broadcasts to advance our cause in areas where we compete for influence with the Soviet Union, primarily Eastern Europe. Daily broadcasting programs have now become recognized and probably permanent instruments of foreign policy for 49 governments. The objective of these programs is to win the populations in the listening countries to the social and political customs of the broadcasting nation. The decision of Congress, after long debate, to appropriate \$19,000,000 to finance the State Department's international informational program for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947 enables the United States to carry forward its program in this field, first exploited seriously during World War II through the Office of War Information and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

U.S. INFORMATION ABROAD. Some observers of the work of the State Department Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs have been critical. "As I visited many of the countries in the old world last year, I found that other powers did a much better job in informing other countries about themselves than the United States," Chester E. Merrow, Republican of New Hampshire and member of Foreign Affairs Committee, said in the House on July 16. While still imperfect, the conduct of State Department informational activities has improved since Mr. Merrow saw them in operation. Broadcasts today go out in 24 languages to 67 countries. The budget provides for 3,100 employees, who spread information not only through broadcasts but through motion pictures (of which a film on the Tennessee Valley Authority is the most popular with foreign audiences), through exchange of peoples, and through libraries.

Eastern European governments have readily agreed to the establishment of American libraries in their capitals, and have not prohibited their people from listening to American broadcasts. The Polish government has made available governmental radio stations for rebroadcasting American shortwave programs from platters. Once a week Polish stations broadcast recordings prepared in the United States on topics relating to American transportation, agriculture, political institutions, etc., and after the broadcasts Polish professional groups discuss the scripts on the air. The broadcast and the daily news summary, which the State Department distributes by radio to diplomatic missions abroad, furnish news-

papers in the receiving countries, including Eastern Europe, with large quantities of American news. Partial censorship has at times limited the use Rumanian and Hungarian newspapers make of this officially disseminated information.

News bulletins are displayed in the American libraries in Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest and Warsaw. In the Belgrade library last February 820 visitors were attracted daily by the news bulletins, three copies of which are on view each day in a special room. The Bucharest library invites all comers to listen to the "Voice of America" information program emanating daily from its loud speakers. The Belgrade library also provides weekly lectures on American subjects, and distributes pictorial maps of the United States to Yugoslav children. The State Department informational officers have less freedom in Russia than in neighboring countries, but the Soviet government in June increased to 50,000 the number of copies of the United States official magazine, *America*, distributed monthly in the U.S.S.R. at 80 cents a copy. Assistant Secretary of State William Benton estimated, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee this spring, that each copy had from 5 to 50 readers.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROGRAM. The Administration's interest in conducting the program rests generally upon the hope, that from knowing about the United States, foreign peoples will come to think well of this country; and specifically from the expectation that presentation of official views on current questions will win support for American policies. Letters from foreign listeners (500 Italians wrote in February, 1,800 in May) increasingly reveal that interest exists abroad in American radio programs. Yet many chiefs of diplomatic missions abroad remain unpersuaded that the broadcasts and other programs are politically advantageous, and accordingly discourage the operation. Political officials in the State Department tend to deny officials concerned with public affairs any participation in the formulation of policy, for whose explanation to people overseas the publicists are responsible. They also try to control the selection of information and cultural officials for foreign posts. The result is that the officials in charge of information make less of a contribution to policy than their position warrants, and that many inexperienced or ill-suited persons are inadequately handling the United States informational program in foreign capitals.

BLAIR BOLLES